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ABSTRACT
For the very first time in EU history, the 2014 EP elections provided citizens with
the opportunity to influence the nomination of the Commission President by
casting a vote for the main Europarties’ ‘lead candidates’. By subjecting the
position of the Commission President to an open political contest, many
experts have formulated the expectation that heightened political competition
would strengthen the weak electoral connection between EU citizens and EU
legislators, which some consider a root cause for the EU’s lack of public
support. In particular, this contest was on display in the so-called ‘Eurovision
Debate’, a televised debate between the main contenders for the Commission
President broadcasted live across Europe. Drawing on a quasi-experimental
study conducted in 24 EU countries, we find that debate exposure led to
increased cognitive and political involvement and EU support among young
citizens. Unfortunately, the debate has only reached a very small audience.
KEYWORDS EP election campaign; EU attitudes; political knowledge; televised debate
Introduction
Concerns about the European Union’s (EU) democratic qualities are as old as
the European integration project itself, as are suggestions and attempts to
remedy the EU’s democratic deficit. The creation and gradual expansion of
the European Parliament’s (EP) prerogatives and, in particular, the introduc-
tion of direct elections to the EP in 1979, are among the major institutional
innovations to address this deficit (see, e.g., Rittberger 2012; Tulli 2016).
However, expectations that the empowerment of the EP over time and the
introduction of direct elections would strengthen the electoral connection
between citizens and elected EU legislators have been largely disappointed
(see Hix and Hoyland 2013). In sharp contrast to national elections and parlia-
ments, EP elections are much less attractive to voters, as the considerably
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lower (and declining) turnout rates indicate. Consequently, EP elections have
been referred to as ‘second-order national elections’ (Reif and Schmitt 1980).
Parties, media and ultimately also voters treat them as national contests, with
EU-related issues taking a backseat.
Follesdal and Hix (2006) have advanced a powerful argument that the key
to mend the weak electoral connection is to foster political competition at the
EU-level. Absent a true electoral contest at the EU-level, whose outcome
would affect the course of the EU’s policy agenda and absent a choice to
determine the EU’s top political personnel, the electoral connection is likely
to stay weak (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 552). While battles over the direction
of the EU’s policy agenda have become a regular feature of political
decision-making inside the EP as well as between the EP and the Council
(Hix and Hoyland 2013), these developments have, thus far, not affected elec-
toral competition in the run-up to EP elections. At the same time, aspirations
are high that a contest over the EU’s (top) personnel decisions might be more
effective in infusing competition in the electoral campaign preceding EP elec-
tions: One of the most important posts in the EU’s political system is the Pre-
sident of the European Commission, who defines the Commission’s work
programme and thus sets its policy-making priorities. For many observers,
the ‘role of the Commission is not fundamentally different from other political
executives.’ (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 554; Hix 2008: 155). Hence, subjecting the
office of the Commission President to an open political contest rather than
letting heads of state and government pick their preferred candidate in
‘smoked filled rooms’ has become a battle call for academics, pundits and
politicians sharing concerns about the EU’s democratic deficit and lack of pol-
itical competition. A contest for one of the EU’s top political offices should
contribute to mend the electoral connection: Citizens are likely to be better
informed about EU policy objectives when there are competitive elections
and higher stakes, they should also be more motivated to participate in EP
elections, and possibly confer a higher degree of legitimacy and the EU as a
polity (see, e.g., Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008).
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, political activists and
elites were now presented with a new institutional mechanism, which was
premised on the idea to connect voters with the exercise of political power
at the EU-level.1 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council nominated
a candidate for Commission President, and once the heads of state and gov-
ernment had made up their minds, the chosen candidate was submitted to
the EP for approval. Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union, which
was amended through the Lisbon Treaty, now stipulates:
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having
held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified
majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of
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the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by
a majority of its component members. (Publications Office of the European
Union 2010: 26)
In the run-up to the 2014 EP elections, political pressure emanated from the
Commission and the EP, as well as from several national capitals to fundamen-
tally alter the nomination process for the successor of José Manuel Barroso,
then Commission President at the time. Both, Barroso, the main party
groups in the EP, and the majority of transnational European party groups
(Europarties) called for a process whereby each Europarty would nominate
a ‘lead candidate’ for the Commission’s top ofﬁce. These lead candidates
would, in turn, play a central role in the political campaign for the 2014 EP
elections. While the implementation of the lead candidate-concept was
hotly contested (see, e.g., Hobolt 2014), it also marked a watershed, since
each Europarty did in fact nominate a transnational candidate for the Com-
mission’s top post.
The 2014 EP election campaign thus provides for an ideal quasi-experimen-
tal setting to explore whether the expectation that increased political compe-
tition improves the electoral connection and hence the quality of democracy
is borne out in reality. In this article, our focus is on one particular innovation
of the 2014 EP election campaign, which is directly connected to the contest
of different lead candidates for the position of Commission President: The
campaign included a series of televised debates among these candidates,
the most prominent of which took place on 15 May 2014. The so-called ‘Euro-
vision debate’, a multilingual 90-minute discussion among the Europarty
nominees for Commission President, addressed some of the most pressing
problems facing the EU and was broadcasted on numerous TV stations,
radio channels and internet streams throughout and even beyond the EU.
The Eurovision debate was the culmination of a series of televised debates
(totalling seven) during the 2014 EP election campaign. What rendered the
Eurovision debate special compared to the other debates was that it starred
all five top candidates for the post, whereas in the other debates only two
to four candidates were invited (sometimes not even including the top candi-
dates). Moreover, the Eurovision debate was broadcasted in the vast majority
of the EU member states, while the other debates were aired in only a subset
of member states (for an overview see Maier and Faas 2014).
Hence, for the very first time in the history of the EU an overwhelming
majority of EU citizens had the unprecedented opportunity to compare the
positions and personalities of the candidates running for Commission Presi-
dent in a campaign format familiar from the context of national elections.
In this article we inquire whether the debate generated the desired effect,
i.e., did it contribute to improving the EU’s democratic quality because EU citi-
zens now have an actual opportunity to influence who will be the next
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Commission President?2 The literature on televised debates at the national
level has demonstrated that these campaign formats affect voters, i.e., their
cognitions, motivations, attitudes, and even voting choices. Whether this
has been the case in the 2014 European election and whether the TV
debate format incites electoral competition are open questions, which this
article sets out to address. To do so, we present the results of a quasi-exper-
imental study with young voters conducted in 24 EU member states. Since we
have carried out a quasi-experiment with self-selected student samples, our
data are neither representative for any of the countries under investigation
nor for young voters. Hence, like other lab-experiments our data lack external
validity. Nevertheless, these data are very valuable as it has a high degree of
internal validity. In addition, there is evidence that voluntary student samples
are appropriate for experimental effect studies (see Druckman and Kam 2011).
We proceed as follows: In the next section (2.), we will bring together some
of the key arguments from the EU’s democratic deficit-debate, hinted at
above, and the literature on televised debates to develop expectations
about the possible effects of the Eurovision debate on voters: This will
allow us to analyse, in the next step, whether political competition improves
voter knowledge about candidates, whether it motivates them to cast a vote,
and whether competition affects EU-related attitudes. In section 3, we
describe the research design and data, followed by an empirical analysis of
the impact of the Eurovision debate (4.). Our results show that the debate
had a recognizable impact on our respondents, indicating higher cognitive
and political involvement, as well as attitudinal changes. In the final section
(5.) we will critically discuss these findings and suggest avenues for further
research.
Electoral competition and EU support: insights from research on
TV debates
Following Robert Dahl (1971), a democratic polity ought to be responsive to
the preferences of its citizens, and for government to be responsive it has
to provide guarantees for effective public participation as well as for public
policies and electoral offices to be open to public contestation. Moreover,
for decisions to be meaningful and informed there has to be access to alterna-
tive sources of information. Follesdal and Hix (2006) echo the Dahlian perspec-
tive on democracy when they diagnose that a lack of public contestation is at
the core of the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit. Introducing contestation by
means of a debate on EU issues combined with an electoral contest about the
EU’s top executive post should, so they argue, lessen the legitimacy deficit and
mend the electoral connection between citizens and EU legislators (Hix 2008:
86). What about the mechanisms linking electoral competition and a growing
sense of democratic legitimacy? Political contestation strengthens the
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subjective content of democracy by providing a battle for control of political
power and the policy agenda at the European level, between rival groups of
leaders with rival policy platforms, where the winner and losers of this battle
are clearly identifiable (Hix 2008: 85).
More competition ‘would also enable citizens to understand European policy
issues, to form opinions about the options available, and in time accept why
certain reforms are necessary rather than reject any policy change directed
from Brussels as illegitimate’ (Hix 2008: 108). Heightened political contestation
and debate are thus hypothesized to affect citizens’ attitudes toward the EU
and, in turn, positively impact the EU’s perceived democratic quality. Could
exposure to a televised debate among the top candidates for the Commission
Presidency affect voters’ knowledge about the EU, increase their motivation
and ability to form opinions about EU issues, as suggested by the proponents
of instilling more political contestation into the EU arena?
First, a televiseddebate in the run-up to theEPelections couldhavean impact
on citizens’ political cognitions: ‘A debate would make the candidates more
widely recognizable, and enable [… ] the public to understand the personal
and policy differences between the candidates’ (Hix 2008: 161). More precisely,
Hix (2008: 162) suggests ‘the public would be able to identify who the Commis-
sion president is and what he or she aims to achieve’. Turning to the debate lit-
erature, the majority of debate researchers agree that viewers do learn from
debates – subjectively as well as objectively. After watching a debate, recipients
usually know more about the issues debated and candidates debating them.
Learning effects are particularly pronounced for less known candidates (see,
e.g., Holbrook 1999; Zhu et al. 1994) and candidates running for one’s ‘own’
party (see, e.g., Abramowitz 1978; Jacoby et al. 1986). In addition, recipients do
not only learn factual information. They often also consider themselves better
informed about politics afterwards than prior to the debate (see, e.g., Kaid
et al. 2000). This effect has already been demonstrated for German viewers of
the Eurovision debate (Dinter andWeissenbach 2015). Based on these findings,
we could expect that a debate among candidates for the post of Commission
President should lead toagreater awarenessof the candidates and their respect-
ive stances on EU policies. We therefore expect that watching the debate
increases the ability of viewers’ to make judgements about the candidates’ per-
sonal and political profiles (H1). In addition, we expect that debate exposure
increases viewers’ sense about being informedabout the EUandEUpolitics (H2).
Second, more competitive and consequential elections could also have an
effect on the motivations underlying political involvement and political partici-
pation. Hix (2013: 11) states this expectation quite clearly: ‘If a party-based
contest for the President of the Commission emerges in 2014 [… ] some citi-
zens in Europe would feel they have influenced the choice of the most power-
ful office in the EU for the first time.’ Moreover, Follesdal and Hix (2006: 550)
assume that ‘competition fosters political debate’ and thus assume that
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exposure to a leadership contest should increase campaign interest and cam-
paign communication. It should also instil a sense of internal efficacy, i.e., the
feeling that people have some means of influence on EU politics. The debate
literature provides ample evidence that debates can stimulate the motivations
underlying electoral participation. In particular, it has been demonstrated that
watching televised debates usually increases campaign interest (see, e.g., Pfau
1987; Weaver and Drew 2001). Moreover, debate viewership correlates with
higher turnout (see, e.g., Best and Hubbard 1999). In particular, it positively
affects participation of voters with a low level of campaign interest (Maier
and Faas 2011). There is less conclusive evidence when it comes to the
effects on viewers’ feeling of internal efficacy. Based on the findings in the
existing literature, we expect that exposure to a televised debate will increase
campaign interest (H3). Given the new features of the 2014 EP election cam-
paign with ‘lead candidates’ competing for the office of Commission President,
we also expect that watching the debate will strengthen viewers’ feeling of
internal efficacy (H4) even though there is little evidence in the literature per-
taining to this so far (see, e.g., Hobolt 2014). Viewers might very well under-
stand though that – for the very first time since the first direct elections to
the EP in 1979 – they have an actual say in deciding on the EU’s top personnel
and the EU’s political agenda. After all, Monica Maggioni, the moderator of the
Eurovision debate, as well as Alexis Tsipras and Martin Schulz emphasized in
the course of the televised debate that one of the European parties’ top candi-
dates would serve as the next Commission President, which also reflected the
overall media tone in the run-up to the election – even though some national
governments were hesitant to fully accept the new procedure prior to the elec-
tions. Overall, we think that there is good reason to believe that the audience of
the debate accepted these claims, which in turn leads us to expect a positive
effect of watching the debate on viewers’ internal efficacy.
Third, heightened political competition can have consequences for political
attitudes about the EU. Follesdal and Hix (2006: 550) posit ‘political compe-
tition is an essential vehicle for opinion formation. Competition fosters politi-
cal debate, which in turn promotes the formation of public opinion on
different policy options’. Following this line of reasoning, political competition
could potentially counteract the second-order character of EP elections, which
still ‘have very little to do with “Europe”’ (Hix 2008: 79). Thus, boosting political
competition should increase the relevance of candidates running for office at
the EU-level and of EU issues.3 More precisely, Hix (2008) claims that, instead
of focussing on the national policy agenda more electoral competition will
highlight the relevance of EU issues and contribute to the EU’s perceived
legitimacy. Turning to the debate literature, the actual influence of debates
on political attitudes (and voting behaviour, which is not the focus of this con-
tribution) is heavily disputed. While two meta-analyses (Benoit et al. 2003;
McKinney and Warner 2013) indicate that viewing televised debates affects
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issue preferences, attitudes towards the candidates as well as voting behav-
iour, most studies on debates in the U.S. suggest that debates can only
reinforce already existing attitudes and voting intentions rather than trans-
form them (for a summary see McKinney and Carlin 2004). These findings
tie in with the results from classical campaign research that a reinforcement
of existing attitudes and voting intentions is the most important campaign
effect. Mechanisms of selective exposure and selective information proces-
sing usually prevent individuals from receiving ‘wrong’, i.e., contradictory
information, and thus from changing their attitudes (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944).
On the other hand, debate exposure strengthens the perceived importance
of the issues debated (see, e.g., Benoit et al. 2003). The picture for debates
in European states is less clear-cut. For some European countries the impact
of debates seems to be rather limited (e.g., Maricchiolo et al. 2010), whereas
studies for other countries suggest that debates are more persuasive. For
instance, it has been demonstrated that almost one fifth of the Croatian
voters changed their voting intention after the 2005 debates (Skoko 2005).
Furthermore, significant parts of the German electorate changed their
opinions about the respective candidates running for chancellor and even
revised their voting intentions after watching a debate (see, e.g., Maier and
Faas 2011). The strongest impact was observed for citizens not identifying
with a particular political party, but there were also significant conversion
effects for people with an existing party attachment (see, e.g., Maier and
Faas 2011). In addition, existing research also indicates that the Eurovision
debate affected candidate evaluations. Most of the candidates for Commis-
sion President were perceived more positively by German voters after watch-
ing the debate (Dinter and Weissenbach 2015). In addition, exposure to the
debate significantly increased favourable opinions about EU integration and
reduced fears about the EU (Maier et al. 2016).
Finally, debates can also have an impact on more general attitudes about
the political system. The few studies available indicate that watching debates
causes more favourable evaluations of the political system (Wald and Lupfer
1978). This is particularly true for young German voters following the Eurovi-
sion Debate (Maier 2015). Based on these findings, we contend that exposure
to the Eurovision debate should increase the perception that important pro-
blems should be solved by the EU (rather than at the national level) (H5). Fur-
thermore, based on studies indicating that positive media coverage of the EU
should lead to more positive EU attitudes (for a summary see, e.g., Hobolt and
Tilley 2014: 87) as well as on research suggesting that one major focus of the
Eurovision debate was to highlight the virtues of the EU (de Vreese and van
der Brug 2016), we expect debate viewership to result in more positive atti-
tudes about the EU as a polity (H6). These expectations are consistent with
the findings that televised debates can have agenda-setting effects and
increase positive attitudes about the political system as a whole.
8 J. MAIER ET AL.
Research design
To assess the impact of the Eurovision Debate4 among the five top candidates
nominated by the respective Europarties – Jean-Claude Juncker (European
People’s Party), Martin Schulz (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Demo-
crats), Guy Verhofstadt (Alliance for Democrats and Liberals for Europe), Ska
Keller (Greens/European Free Alliance), Alexis Tsipras (European United Left)
– we set up a quasi-experimental pretest-posttest study in 24 European
countries (for details see online appendix 1). In total, 828 eligible voters
(mostly students) watched the debate as it was broadcasted live on a large
screen in their respective universities.5 Reception modes differed across
countries, depending on whether or not a national broadcasting station
aired the debate. 78.0 per cent of the participants were able to watch the
debate simultaneously, translated in their national language; 13.8 per cent
watched the original version of the debate as provided by the European
Broadcasting Union (EBU; candidates were either speaking in English or
with simultaneous translation into English), although this was in most cases
not the native language of our participants.6Immediately prior and immedi-
ately after the debate the participants were asked to fill in questionnaires.7The
questionnaires included questions on campaign interest, attitudes towards
European integration, knowledge about the EU, knowledge about and atti-
tudes towards the candidates, expectations about (posttest: perceptions of)
the debate and the candidates’ debate performance, perceptions of the EP
election campaign, voting intentions, demographics (pretest only), and – in
cases the debate was not provided in the respondents’ mother tongue –
how well they understood the debate8 (posttest only).9
In general, the basic design of this study is similar to a design, which has
been successfully applied in the past to explore the impact of televised
debates in Germany for a series of debates there (see, e.g., German Longitudi-
nal Election Study 2014; Maier and Faas 2003; Maurer et al. 2007). Such a strict
pretest-posttest design, in which participants fill out questionnaires immedi-
ately prior to the debate and also directly afterwards, allows us to trace poss-
ible effects of the debate – in line with our hypotheses presented above – on
the participants of the study in a rigorous manner. We do want to stress,
though, that the design of our study does not include a control group. Strictly
speaking, without such a control group, we are not able to separate effects of
the pretest questionnaire from effects of the treatment (i.e., the debate). As
there is evidence that our sample does not suffer from questionnaire
effects we consider any statistically significant deviation from zero as an
impact of the debate.10 Other data confirm this assessment.11
In order to analyse the data we decided to weight the countries according
to their population size. The basic idea behind this weighting procedure is to
get an impression of how young and well-educated citizens across Europe
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respond to the campaign. By weighting the data we want to avoid that our
results are affected by the scholars’ resources, opportunities, and experiences
with experimental research, which might have affected the sample sizes
obtained in the individual countries.12 The weighted data set includes 51.8
per cent female respondents (minimum: 7.7 per cent in Slovenia; maximum
81.0 per cent in Romania; F = 1.98, df = 23, p < .01). The average age is 22.9
years (minimum: 20.0 years in Lithuania; maximum: 29.7 years in Ireland;
F = 6.33, df = 23, p < .001). 93.6 per cent of the participants are students
(minimum: 83.3 per cent in France; the sample consists exclusively of students
in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Por-
tugal, and Sweden; F = 2.41, df = 23, p < .001). Most of the students are
enrolled in a political science programme (38.5 per cent), a social science pro-
gramme (23.2 per cent), or a programme in communication studies (18.0 per
cent). 20.3 per cent of the students were enrolled in another programme (Χ2 =
653.47, df = 69, p < .001). From those participants who followed the debate in
English, without English being their native language, 1.4 per cent indicated
that they understood less than 50 per cent of what the candidates said. On
average, participants exposed to the English version of the debate indicated
that they understood 84.5 per cent of all candidate messages (minimum: 67.0
in Latvia; maximum: 90.6 per cent in Finland; F = 3.51, df = 8, p < .01).
Our sample is, of course, neither representative for any of the countries
under investigation nor for young voters. As experiments in general, our
data lack external validity. Nevertheless, our design is useful for assessing
debate effects. First, different to survey data experiments have a high internal
validity. We know that the participants of our study were exposed to the
debate. Hence, shifts in attitudes have to be considered as debate-induced
changes. Second, we have no indication that the processing of the debate
and its effects are different for voters not included in our sample. Although
various scholars argue that voluntary student samples are too ‘narrow’ to
draw more general conclusions, other researchers have found that those
samples are appropriate to study social behaviour (Druckman and Kam
2011; Exadaktylos et al. 2013). Since we are interested in the effect of the
debate (and not in distributions of EU-attitudes), we contend that our findings
are valid for young and well-educated European voters in general.
Results
Debate effects on political cognitions
With reference to H1 we expect that exposure to the Eurovision debate should
increase the voters’ ability to evaluate the candidates’ personal and political
profile. This expectation is clearly corroborated (see Table 1). Prior to the
debate, the average viewer was only able to describe his/her feelings toward a
10 J. MAIER ET AL.
minority of the candidates (M = 2.38). After the debate almost every respondent
had an opinion about all of the five candidates (M = 4.99). This increase is statisti-
cally significant (p < .001). The same pattern holds for the candidates’ political
positions. Before the debate, respondents could state an ideological position
for, on average, 2.16 candidates and on EU integration for, on average, 1.96 can-
didates. After the debate, ideological respectively EU positions are reported for,
on average, 4.84 candidates. These increases (+2.68 respectively + 2.88) are stat-
istically significant (p < .001). Although there is a positive impact of debate
exposure for both the personal and the political profile of the candidates in all
countries, the effect varies considerably across countries. For all three variables
the country-specific impact of the debate is significant (p < .001).
We also expect that exposure to the Eurovision debate should increase the
perceived level of information about EU politics (H2), which is confirmed by
our analysis. Overall, the level of subjective information increases from −.30
before the debate to −.04 after the debate. This shift of .26 scale points is stat-
istically significant (p < .001). The maximum effect is +.72, while the strongest
Table 1. Impact of the Eurovision debate on political cognitions.
Before
the
debate
After
the
debate
Difference;
significance of
difference
Strongest
negative
effect
Strongest
positive
effect
Significance of
country
differences
Number of
candidates
rated by
sympathy
2.38 4.99 +2.61, p < .001 +.95 +4.00 p < .001
Number of
candidates
rated by
ideological
position
2.16 4.84 +2.68, p < .001 +1.00 +4.05 p < .001
Number of
candidates
rated by
position on EU
integration
1.96 4.84 +2.88, p < .001 +1.37 +4.30 p < .001
Information
about EU
politics
−.30 −.04 +.26, p < .001 −.17 +.72 p < .001
Notes: Sympathy of the candidates: ‘How would you describe your feelings toward the candidates of
tonight’s debate?’; respondents could indicate that they do not know. Based on this information, a
six-point scale from 0 (‘cannot describe a feeling for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘can describe a
feeling for each of the candidates’) was created; Portugal has been excluded from the analysis of this
question as the candidates’ sympathy ratings were not asked in the Portuguese posttest survey. Candi-
date ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’’. What is the position
of [candidate]?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘per-
ceive a position for each of the candidates’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European
integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed
further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this
issue?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a
position for each of the candidates’). Information about EU politics: ‘I am very well informed about EU
politics’; five-point scale from −2 (‘strongly disagree’) to + 2 (‘strongly agree’).
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negative effect is −.17. Again, our results indicate that reactions to the debate
differ significantly across countries (p < .001).
The Eurovision debate did not only help recipients to develop first-time atti-
tudes towards the candidates.We also see that respondentswho already had an
opinion about the contenders shifted their perceptions of the candidates’ ideo-
logical positions and of their stance on EU integration (see Table 2). With respect
to ideology, all candidates are perceived to stand further to the left after than
before the debate (with the exception of Juncker). For Schulz (p < .05), Tsipras
(p < .001) and Keller (p < .001), these change are statistically significant. In
addition, the perceived ideological polarization among the candidates has
increased in the wake of the debate. The average ideological distance
between the candidate perceived as most to the left and the candidate per-
ceived as most to the right increases from 4.46 to 6.24 scale points (p < .001).
Furthermore, the debates helped citizens to develop and sharpen their
views about the candidates’ positions on EU integration. All candidates are
perceived as more pro-EU after the debate. Except for Tsipras (p > .05), all
changes are statistically significant. In addition, the debate provided viewers
with information helping them to distinguish the candidates. As a conse-
quence, the perceived polarization between the contenders has significantly
increased from, on average, 3.54 to 4.09 scale points (p < .001).
Table 2. Impact of the Eurovision debate on perceived candidates’ ideological positions
and positions on EU integration.
Before
the
debate
After
the
debate
Difference;
significance of
difference
Strongest
negative
effect
Strongest
positive
effect
Significance
of country
differences
Ideological position
Juncker 6.56 6.63 +.07, p > .05 −1.94 +2.33 p > .05
Schulz 4.01 3.83 −.18, p < .05 −2.00 +1.00 p > .05
Verhofstadt 6.10 6.00 −.10, p > .05 −3.00 +1.50 p > .05
Tsipras 2.83 1.87 −.97, p < .001 −5.40 +.80 p < .05
Keller 3.94 2.64 −1.30, p < .001 −2.83 +1.08 p > .05
Candidate polarization 4.46 6.24 +1.78, p < .001 −.06 +4.40 p < .001
Position on EU integration
Juncker 5.77 6.60 +.83, p < .001 −2.75 +3.00 p < .001
Schulz 6.34 6.78 +.44, p < .001 −1.79 +1.80 p > .05
Verhofstadt 5.44 6.56 +1.12, p < .001 −1.75 +3.25 p > .05
Tsipras 5.65 5.74 +.09, p > .05 −2.00 +2.33 p > .05
Keller 6.24 6.80 +.56, p < .01 −2.50 +6.00 p > .05
Candidate polarization 3.54 4.09 +.55, p < .001 −4.75 +1.73 p < .01
Notes: Analyses are based on subjects evaluating the respective candidates before and after the debate;
NIdeology = (285; 511), NEU Integration = (269; 474). Candidate ideological position: ‘In political matters
people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is the position of [candidate]?’; eleven-point scale from
0 (‘left’) to 10 (‘right’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the
economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed further. Others
say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’;
eleven-point scale from 0 (‘European integration has already gone too far’) to 10 (‘European integration
should be pushed further’). Candidate polarization: absolute difference between the candidate perceived
as ideological most left and the candidate perceived as ideological most right respectively between the
candidate perceived as most in favour of further EU integration and the candidate perceived as most
critical of further EU integration.
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Debate effects on motivations
We also hypothesized that watching the debate will positively affect the
motivations underlying electoral participation. In particular, exposure to the
debate should lead to an increase in campaign interest (H3) as well as to a
stronger sense of internal efficacy (H4). We can confirm both hypotheses.
With respect to internal efficacy, we observe a significant increase from .19
before the debate to .26 after the debate (Table 3). The shift of +.07 scale
points is statistically significant. Still, in four out of 24 countries, we observe
that internal efficacy has decreased. The maximum effect is −.33. In contrast,
exposure to the debate has stimulated an increase in internal efficacy in the
overwhelming majority of countries. The maximum effect is +.41.
In addition, we see a significant increase in campaign interest. Starting from
1.83 scale points before the debate, campaign interest rose by .26 scale points
to 2.09 scale points after the debate. In each of the countries under investi-
gation, campaign interest has increased. The smallest effect is +.04, the
largest +.70. Although in most countries the impact of the debate on motiv-
ation turned out to be positive, the size of the effects significantly differ across
countries for internal efficacy (p < .001) as well as campaign interest (p < .01).
Debate effects on political attitudes
With respect to political attitudes we argued that the importance attached to
EU issues is likely to rise if citizens were exposed to the Eurovision debate (H5).
In addition, we have claimed that attitudes towards the EU should become
more favourable as a consequence of debate exposure (H6). H5 can be con-
firmed. The share of respondents who indicate that the most pressing political
problem at the domestic level should now be solved at the EU level increased
from 44.5 per cent before the debate to 52.9 per cent after the debate (Table
4). The increase of 8.4 percentage points is statistically significant. However, in
three out of the 24 countries under investigation, we observed the opposite
Table 3. Impact of the Eurovision debate on motivations.
Before
the
debate
After
the
debate
Difference;
significance of
difference
Strongest
negative
effect
Strongest
positive
effect
Significance of
country
differences
Internal
efficacy
.19 .26 +.07, p < .01 −.33 +.41 p < .001
Campaign
interest
1.83 2.09 +.26, p < .001 +.04 +.70 p < .01
Notes: Internal efficacy: (a) ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me
can’t really understand what’s going on.’, (b) ‘I have a pretty good understanding of what is going on in
politics.’; five-point scale from −2 (‘strongly disagree’) to + 2 (‘strongly agree’); after item a) has been
reversed both variables were put together into an index running from −2 (‘low internal efficacy’‘) to
+ 2 (‘high internal efficacy’).Campaign interest: ‘And to what extent would you say are you interested
in the current European election campaign?’; four-point scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘very’).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 13
trend. The strongest negative impact is −16.0 percentage points. Neverthe-
less, the perceived relevance of the EU increased in most countries. The
largest effect is + 37.5 percentage points.
In addition, the data indicate that debate exposure causes more pro-EU atti-
tudes. In particular, the already rather favourable view towards European inte-
gration (M = 1.06) has become more favourable as a result of debate exposure
(M = 1.45). This increase is statistically significant (+.39 scale points, p < .001). At
the country level, the strongest negative impact is −.21, the largest positive
effect is + 1.58. In contrast to these findings, general support of one’s
country EU membership remained by-and-large unchanged (M = .65 before
vs. M = .63 after the debate, difference: −.02 scale points, p > .05). Hence, H6
can only partially supported. In seven out of 24 countries we observe a
decline of EU support. The strongest negative impact of the debate is −.40
scale points. Nevertheless, in the majority of countries, respondents developed
more favourable EU attitudes as a consequence of debate reception. The stron-
gest effect is +.33 scale points. For all variables under investigation we observe
very different responses across the different EU member states, which pass the
levels for statistical significance (at least p < .05).
Discussion and conclusion
Our data, which reflects the attitudes and perceptions of young and well-edu-
cated voters across 24 EU member states, suggests that exposure to the
debate caused higher cognitive and political involvement. In particular,
exposure to the debate enabled our respondents to make more informed
Table 4. Impact of the Eurovision debate on political attitudes.
Before
the
debate
After
the
debate
Difference;
significance of
difference
Strongest
negative
effect
Strongest
positive
effect
Significance of
country
differences
Most important
national
problem
should be
solved by EU
44.5 52.9 +8.4, p < .001 −16.0 +37.5 p < .01
Position on EU
integration
1.06 1.45 +.39, p < .001 −.21 +1.58 p < .05
Evaluation of EU
membership
.65 .63 −.02, p > .05 −.40 +.33 p < .001
Notes:Most important problem: ‘What do you think would be the most appropriate level to deal with those
three problems that you have just mentioned?’; 1 = ‘European level’, 2 = ‘national level’, 3 = ‘regional/
local level’; code 1 was multiplied by 100, codes 2 and 3 are recoded into code 0. EU integration:
‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member
states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion on this
issue?’ Eleven-point scale from −5 (‘European integration has already gone too far’) to + 5 (‘European
integration should be pushed further’). EU membership: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that your
country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor
bad?’; three-point scale from −1 (‘bad thing’) to + 1 (‘good thing’).
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judgements of the candidates’ personality and political profile (H1). Even
those viewers who had an opinion about the candidates’ ideological position
and their stance on EU integration prior to the debate displayed a tendency to
change their perceptions afterwards. Most noteworthy is that the perceived
polarization among the candidates has increased due to debate reception.
This is true for both dimensions. Despite some doubts expressed in the litera-
ture (see, e.g., de Vreese and van der Brug 2016), the debate clearly helped
voters to distinguish the candidates running for Commission President. More-
over, watching the debate also increased the overall level of information
about EU politics (H2), led to a heightened sense of internal efficacy, i.e.,
the belief that one can influence politics (H3), and a stronger interest in the
campaign (H4). In addition, having watched the debate also led respondents
to display stronger agreement with the claim that the most important political
problems of one’s own country should be solved at the EU-level (H5). Further-
more, viewers also tended to hold more positive evaluations about the EU.
Since we could not observe this pattern for all EU-related attitudes, H6 can
only partially supported.13
Overall, our results indicate that exposure to the Eurovision Debate has
been conducive to infuse the EP election campaign with a dose of political
competition, thereby tackling one of the professed causes of the EU’s demo-
cratic legitimacy deficit. We have demonstrated that by watching the debate,
our respondents have not only developed better knowledge about the candi-
dates’ stances on the EU and policy issues, they have also come to see the
differences in these positions more clearly. The claim voiced by Follesdal
and Hix (2006) that increased political competition instils cognitive involve-
ment and lead to more informed vote choice is thus borne out. In contrast,
the finding that exposure to the debate does not increase support of one’s
country EU membership runs counter to the expectation that positive cover-
age of the EU leads to more positive EU attitudes and hence an increase in the
EU’s perceived legitimacy.
Based on our results, which broadly support the argument about the posi-
tive effects of political competition on public support, we suggest that the
debate format is an appropriate instrument to foster political debate, citizen
involvement and support in the EU. As the recognition of the top candidates
running for Commission President increases the likelihood to participate in
the 2014 EP elections (Schmitt et al. 2015), exposure to the debate can also
have highly desirable behavioural consequences. From this perspective, EU
pundits should press for a wide and prominent coverage of TV debates
among ‘lead candidates’ in future EP elections. The 2014 debate can thus
serve as a starting point for developing a tradition of televised debates,
which already exist in many democracies. This format is particularly important
for EP elections, because debates among political leaders competing for pol-
itical office can serve as a common point of reference (see also Benoit 2014: 4)
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for all European citizens, when otherwise the number of EP election cam-
paigns matches the number of member states. Hence, such a debate can
foster an EU-wide campaign format by providing a common frame for
national campaigns. In addition, future televised debates will offer exciting
opportunities for political communication research on EP election campaigns.
Unlike previous effect-analyses focusing on, e.g., the impact of (national) EP
campaign spots, (national) EP campaign posters, or (national) media coverage
of the EP campaign, a debate among leaders running for Commission Presi-
dent provides the opportunity to compare the impact of an uniform cam-
paign stimulus across different EU member states. Moreover, we have
shown that bringing together research on political campaigns in general
and TV debates in particular with research on the EU’s democratic credentials
offers ample opportunities to scrutinize claims that have hitherto not been
subject to systematic empirical exploration. We are thus positive that research
on the effects of campaign information, such as TV debates, not only improves
our understanding about the mechanisms underlying EP campaign effects,
but also about their implications for the legitimacy of the EU’s political system.
Of course, our data and research design have some limitations. Although our
experimental design leaves little room for speculations about how young and
well-educated votes react to a debate among political leaders in the EU, we
have no empirical evidence about how other groups of voters were influenced
by exposure to the debate format. Based on results from debate research, we
assume that we rather underestimated the potential impact of the debate.
Existing research indicates that debate effects are stronger for voters with
lower levels of education (see, e.g., Maier and Faas 2011). One crucial step to
remedy this shortcoming is to use the format of representative survey, includ-
ing an item about whether or not a respondent was watching the debate. This
would enable us to find out about the impact of the debate on other groups of
voters. In addition, survey data could provide us with insights about who actu-
ally watched the debate. Second, the effects we found cannot be generalized
to the public-at-large. The media neither provided an appropriate stage for the
debate, nor did media broadcasters put a lot of effort into covering this event.14
As impressive as it may sound that the Eurovision debate was broadcasted by
55 TV and nine radio channels as well as streamed on 88 websites across the EU
and beyond (European Broadcasting Union 2014a, 2014c), most of the media
channels airing the debate were, at best, small, second-rate or highly special-
ized news-channels, which tend to attract only a limited viewership. Moreover,
in some member states the debate was accessible only via internet-live-stream
or broadcasted the next day (see online appendix 2). Although the moderator
of the debate, Monica Maggioni, was keen to stress that the debate would be
highly attractive to voters – she argued that the candidates would have the
‘chance to tell 400 million voters why they should get Europe’s biggest job’
(see Maier and Faas 2014: 4) – the available audience ratings were rather
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poor in most countries (see online appendix 2).15 Compared with the viewer-
ship of TV debates preceding national elections, the Eurovision debate fared
poorly. For example, the TV debate in the run-up of the 2013 German national
election attracted 17.7 million viewers (Gscheidle and Gerhard 2013: 565). In
contrast, the Eurovision debate was watched by 160,000 viewers, less than
one per cent of the national debate audience in Germany. Despite some selec-
tive audience rating-successes in individual countries, such as Cyprus, the
media missed an opportunity to put the European elections in the limelight.
In the event that debates between the top candidates running for Commission
President will become a feature of future EP election campaigns, the media
should definitely increase their coverage of the event and provide airtime in
more established programmes to increase the audience ratings. Of course,
this criticism also applies to national political parties, which are the main
actors in the campaign and, until now, have displayed little enthusiasm to high-
light the importance of the debates (see Franklin 2014). Third, not all EU
member states are included in our study and some of the sample sizes are
small. To obtain a more complete picture for the EU subsequent studies
should include all member states with a sufficient number of cases. Increasing
the number of observations would also offer the opportunity to runmore soph-
isticated data analyses (e.g., multi-level analyses) and to uncover country-
specific response patterns. Since our results suggest that there are cross-cul-
tural differences, this could be a very promising path for even more rigid
testing in the future and for establishing cross-cultural experimental work as
a line of research. Finally, from the purview of democratic accountability, it is
important for voters to know where political decisions originate in order to
be able to assign responsibility. It has been demonstrated in the literature
that access to more EU-related information increases the accuracy of citizens’
responsibility attributions (Hobolt and Tilley 2014: 148), thus fostering demo-
cratic accountability. Our findings suggest that the debate has made our
respondents more informed about the EU and led to increased awareness of
its relevance for problem-solving. This should, as a result, enable them to
‘better… navigate the complex institutional landscape of the EU’ (Hobolt
and Tilley 2014: 149). While this is potentially good news from a democratic
accountability perspective, our study does not lend itself to sweeping general-
izations. Whether or not the Eurovision Debate can be seen as a modest step
towards reducing the democratic accountability deficit necessitates further
experimental or survey-based research.
Notes
1. See Franklin (2014: 9–10) for a critical assessment of the institutional change
adopted in the Lisbon Treaty. He expects that it is rather unlikely that national
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parties will design their campaigns around the issues highlighted by the differ-
ent candidates running for Commission President.
2. See, e.g., http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/editorial-on-the-importan
ce-of-the-eu-election-for-european-democracy-a-971766.html; accessed 21 February
2016; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-elections-2014-a-v
ote-for-europe--or-simply-a-chance-to-put-the-boot-in-9406013.html; http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22904941; accessed 29 May 2015.
3. At the same time, increasing competition could also carry negative conse-
quences for the EU’s democratic legitimacy. In particular, since political compe-
tition creates winners and losers, losers might not ‘accept the winning coalition
as legitimate’ (Hix 2008: 188). Moreover, others argue that enhanced political
competition unleashes a ‘sleeping giant’ (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004: 32),
by activating pro or anti EU-orientations, especially when debates revolve
around constitutive issues, which relate to the EU’s institutional trajectory or
its membership base (see Bartolini 2005).
4. For a transcript of the debate see Maier and Faas (2014).
5. In most instances, the debate was watched on TV on 15 May 2014. In some
countries, the debate was broadcasted via an Internet live-stream, but not on
TV. In addition, in some states the debate was videotaped and broadcasted
the next day (see online appendix 2). Due to technical reasons (e.g., because
the university was closed when the debate was aired live on TV) recipients in
the Czech Republic, France, Romania (Cluj), and Sweden watched the video-
taped debate.
6. The remaining 8.2 per cent of the sample started with the simultaneous trans-
lation but had to switch to the EBU version due to either bad translation or tech-
nical problems.
7. In general, the questionnaires were in English. In some countries, the question-
naires were translated in the native language.
8. Overall, these respondents did understand the debate very well, as their answers
show. Only four of these respondents indicated that they understood only about
half of the debate. The exclusion of these respondents from data analysis does
not affect our results.
9. In seven countries, recipients additionally had the opportunity to spontaneously
evaluate the candidates during the debate. To do so, they used a web-based RTR
push button system (for a description of the system see Maier et al. 2016). Using
this system, individual positive and negative reactions to candidate messages
were recorded on a second-by-second basis. Real-time response measurement
of candidate messages was successfully implemented in Germany, Poland, Slo-
venia, and United Kingdom including 210 participants. As it has been demon-
strated that using RTR technique in general neither distracts people from
following the debate nor increases attention to the debate (Maier 2012), it
seems unlikely that this treatment will affect the variables in focus of this paper.
10. It has been shown that in experimental studies with self-recruited participants
having a very high level of general interest in politics questionnaire-induced
pretest-posttest differences are very rare (see, e.g., Lupfer and Wald 1979). In
addition, our pretest-questionnaires show for specific debate-related questions
that the specific knowledge is rather low to non-existent. Against this backdrop,
the pretest-questionnaire is unlikely to activate pre-existing knowledge.
11. We have tested the existence of pretest-posttest differences for a control group
for the design that has been applied to the European debate in the context of
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the 2013 German Federal Election (the data can be downloaded via www.gesis.
org/wahlen/gles/daten/; study number ZA5711) and did not find any significant
changes for campaign interest, political efficacy, and for different measures of
EU-related attitudes for the control group.
12. An analysis of the unweighted or differently weighted data indicates that our
weighting procedure does not cause an exaggeration of debate effects: About
half of the observed influences are slightly stronger if we do not weight the
data or if weight all countries equally whereas the other half is slightly
weaker. Furthermore, applying other weighting strategies does not change
the reported results substantially. The only exception is that Tsipras is perceived
as significantly more in favour of EU integration after the debate than before if
these data are not weighted or if we weight all countries equally (p < .05). In the
data presented in Table 2 this effect is insignificant. In addition, country differ-
ences tend to be more often statistically significant if no or an alternative
weighting procedure is used. The results for these alternative weighting pro-
cedures are provided in online appendix 3.
13. Our data analyses also show that the reactions to the debate were far from hom-
ogenous across the different EU member states: The between-country differ-
ences of the measured debate effects display statistical significance for all
variables included in our study. Since the goal of this contribution was to look
at the aggregate picture, we can neither report nor discuss and explain the
potential causes of the observed cross-country differences here, but these find-
ings will need further exploration. In addition, our findings suggest that lessons
about the impact of the debate cannot simply be transferred from one country
to another. Obviously, the domestic context matters for the effect of campaign
messages (see, e.g., Hobolt 2014).
14. For the debate media sweep surrounding the debate, see European Broadcast-
ing Union (2014b).
15. To our knowledge there is no information about the total reach of the debate.
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